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Abstract
This paper investigates the mechanism of various faults of momentum exchange
devices. These devices are modeled as a cascade electric motor (EM) - variable
speed drive(VSD) system. Considering the mechanical part of the EM and the
VSD system, the potential faults are reviewed and summarized. Thus with a
clear understanding of these potential faults, a general fault model in a cascade
multiplicative structure is established for momentum exchange devices. Based
on this general model, various fault scenarios can be simulated, and the possi-
ble output can be appropriately visualized. In this paper, six types of working
condition are identified and the corresponding fault models are constructed.
Using this fault model, the control responses using reaction wheels and single
gimbal control moment gyros under various fault conditions are demonstrated.
The simulation results show the severities of the faults and demonstrate that
the additive fault is more serious than the multiplicative fault from the view-
point of control accuracy. Finally, existing fault-tolerant control strategies are
briefly summarized and potential approaches including both passive and active
ones to accommodate gimbal fault of single gimbal control moment gyro are
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1. Introduction
Momentum exchange devices(MEDs) have significant advantages of cleanli-
ness, without the expulsion of gases, over thrusters. In addition, these devices
came always with small volume and light weight. Thus they have been widely
employed in spacecraft attitude determination and control system (ADCS) [1,
2, 3, 4]. Among all momentum exchange devices, the reaction wheel (RW) is
the primary attitude control actuator due to its mechanical simplicity and low
cost. However, most RWs only provide less than 1 N·m maximum torque that
is much smaller than control moment gyros (CMGs) with 100 − 5000 N·m max-
imum torque [5]. Thus RWs are replaced by CMGs in the agile spacecraft for
rapid maneuver, such as Pleaides [6] and Wordview-2 [7]. However, failures
of these momentum exchange devices occur occasionally in practical missions.
For instance, four RWs failed on the Far Ultraviolet Spectroscopy Explorer
(FUSE) spacecraft in 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2007, respectively; and two each
on Hayabusa in July and October 2005, Dawn in 2010 and 2012, and Kepler in
2012 and 2013 [8]. The control moment gyros failed and prevented the space-
craft WorldView-4 from pointing accurately in 2019. Thus the development of
fault-tolerant control system for the MEDs actuated spacecraft is urgent.
In existing fault-tolerant researches, most of the work such as [9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14] focus on the control problem itself, except for [11] and [12], where the four
potential faults (recoverable) and/or failures (irrecoverable) of RWs are briefly
introduced. Why the fault are modeled in additive way and multiplicative way
is not clear. For the CMG actuated spacecraft, the fault model of the CMG
is unclear and the fault-tolerant result is rare. In [13], the skew angle of CMG
configuration is analyzed and a genetic algorithm is adopted to simultaneously
tune the skew angle and controller gains to achieve fault tolerant. In [14], Zhang
2
et al. considered the gimbal fault and employed sliding mode control theory to
change the CMG gimbal rate directly to void the singularity and achieve fault
tolerance. Comparing with these existing works, this paper gives insight into the
fault in general momentum exchange devices (MEDs). We explain clearly why
the fault of the reaction wheel can be modeled in additive and multiplicative way,
then generalize the fault model of the reaction wheel to a wide range of MEDs,
especially the single gimbal control moment gyros. The contribution of this
paper paves the way of developing fault-tolerant control strategies for the CMG
actuated spacecraft. Since this work focuses on the fault modeling instead of the
fault-tolerant controller design, the description of the fault-tolerant controller
design is just to describe the potential implementation of our fault model.
For MED fault modeling, MEDs can be regarded as a cascade combination
of an electric motor (EM) and its variable speed drive (VSD) system from a
systemic point of view. More specifically, a RW is a flywheel mounted to an
electric brushless DC motor (BLDC) [15, 16] and the torque is generated through
wheel’s acceleration or deceleration. For CMGs, a momentum wheel is mounted
on one or two gimbals containing two kinds of motors: stepper motor and BLDC
motor [17]. The stepper motor provides precision gimbal control of CMGs while
the BLDC motor provides an efficient way of driving the momentum wheel to
store the angular momentum. Thus the RW is a one-EM-VSD-loop system
and the CMG can essentially be regarded as a cascade combination of two
(SGCMG) or three (DGCMG) EM-VSD loops. All potential faults of RW and
CMGs would lie in the mechanical part of the EM, sensors and actuators of
VSD, or the electrical part of these components.
The details of potential faults in EM-VSD are analyzed in [17, 18, 19, 20,
21, 22, 23] and [24]. For the EM, potential faults are categorized into: stator
faults, rotor faults, eccentricity-related faults and bearing or gear faults. These
faults belong to multiplicative faults. In the VSD, the faults can be categorized
into sensor faults and actuator faults. These faults are considered as additive
faults [21, 25]. The schematic diagram of EM-VSD system containing the po-
tential fault is shown in Fig. 1, where fa(t), fc(t)/aij(t) and fs(t) represent the
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parameter errors of actuators, electric motors and sensors caused by fault and
the detailed explanations can be found in Section 2 to Section 4.
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Figure 1: Fault model of EM-VSD system
Motivated by the aforementioned observations, this paper investigates the
potential faults in the EM-VSD system, which are categorized into multiplica-
tive or additive fault through analyzing an EM-VSD model. The momentum
exchange devices are considered as being in a cascade mechanical structure, in
which an EM-VSD system governs one degree of control freedom and works
independently. Based on this model, and considering potential faults in the
EM-VSD system, a general fault model for momentum exchange devices is then
established. To the best of the auth rs’ knowledge, this is the first attempt
to propose a generalized fault model to a wide range of momentum exchange
devices with a clear understanding of mechanical mechanism.With the utiliza-
tion of this model, the contribution in our work makes it possible to describe
the potential fault scenarios efficiently and effectively, and removes the exist-
ing barrier lacking of a unified fault model in developing the necessary fault-
tolerant controllers for CMG-actuated spacecraft system. Simulations of the
control responses of the RW and SGCMG actuated spacecraft under various
fault scenarios visualize the severity of the multiplicative and additive faults
and show that the additive fault is more serious than the multiplicative fault
from the viewpoint of control accuracy. Finally, existing fault-tolerant control
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strategies are briefly summarized and potential fault-tolerant strategies based
on the proposed fault model to accommodate the gimbal fault of SGCMGs are
demonstrated to describe the potential implementation of our proposed model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the EM
system, the potential faults of the EM and its fault model. Section 3 addresses
the potential faults of sensors and actuators, and the corresponding models are
given. Combined with the model of the EM, the overall structure of the EM-
VSD system and the fault model is established in Section 4. Based on the fault
model of the EM-VSD, a general fault frame of momentum exchange devices
is established in Section 5. Various fault scenarios in different momentum ex-
change devices are then modeled through choosing different model parameters.
In Section 6, simulations are conducted to demonstrate system performance in
the presence of different faults, illustrating the appropriate suitability and ap-
plicability of this general fault frame. In Section 7, the fault-tolerant control
strategies are summarized and potential approaches to hanlde the gimbal faults
of the SGCMGs are given. Finally, conclusions are noted in Section 8.
2. EM Fault Modeling
2.1. Mathematical Model of EM
For the momentum exchange devices, the permanent magnet (PM) brushless
DC motors (BLDC) are widely employed due to their advantages of high power
density, high efficiency, long operating life, noiseless operation, high speed ranges
and etc. The BLDC motors come in single-phase, two-phase, and three phase
configurations. Among these, the three-phase motor is the most popular and
widely used. The 3-phase electronically commutated BLDC motor drive system
is shown in Fig. 2a and the one phase equivalent circuit of BLDC motor is
illustrated in Fig. 2b[26]. Without loss of generality and considering the phase
A, the control input is denoted as Va and the phase current is denoted as Ia. The
electrical equivalent of the armature coil can be described by a resistance Ra,
a self-inductance La and an induced voltage referring to the back electromotive
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force (emf) Ema which opposes the voltage source. The relationship can be
modeled as:
Va = Ema +RaIa + La
dIa
dt
, (1a)
Ema = KEaωr, (1b)
where KEa is the back-emf constant and ωr is the angular velocity of the rotor.
Using the similar method as in [23] and taking the mean value, the electrical
subsystem of the BLDC motor can be described as:
V = kEωr +RI + L
dI
dt
. (2)
Performing an energy balance on the system, the sum of the torques of the
motor must equal zero. Therefore, we have
Jmω˙r + σωr = Te − Tl, (3)
where Jm is the inertia of the rotor and the equivalent mechanical load, σ is the
viscous friction coefficient, and Tl is the load torque. Te is the electromagnetic
torque and expressed as:
Te = KtI, (4)
with Kt being the torque constant depending on the flux density of the fixed
magnets, the reluctance of the iron core, and the number of turns in the armature
winding.
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Figure 2: BLDC motor
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Denoting x = [I ωr]
T as the state variable and V as the control input, the
state space model of a BLDC motor is obtained as:
 I˙
ω˙r
 =
−RL −KEL
Kt
Jm
− σJm
 I
ωr
+
 1L
0
V+
 0
− 1Jm
Tl
y = C
 I
ωr
 , (5)
with y being the measurements. C is the output matrix that decides the mea-
surement output. For example, the matrix C could be the identity matrix to
measure both current I and the angular velocity of the rotor ωr, or it could be
matrix [0, 1] to measure the angular velocity of the rotor ωr only. For EM-VSD
system, ωr is more important, hence we choose matrix C to be [0, 1].
Denoting
A =
−RL −KEL
Kt
Jm
− σJm
 , B =
 1L
0
 , D =
 0
− 1Jm
 ,
and u = V , equation (5) can be further written into a compact form as:x˙ = Ax+Bu+DTly = Cx . (6)
Other motors such as the stepper motors have the similar compact form as (6)
[27, 28].
2.2. Potential Fault of EM
In an EM, there may exist mechanical and electrical faults or failures, or a
combination of these mechanical and electrical faults. Specifically, the potential
faults may be [17, 20, 24, 29]:
• Stator faults. “The most frequently occurring stator fault is the break-
down of the winding insulation in the region where the end windings enter
the stator slots. It may be caused by large electrical voltage stresses,
electro-dynamic forces produced by winding currents, thermal aging from
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multiple heating and cooling cycles, and mechanical vibrations from inter-
nal and external sources. This winding insulation breakdown can result in
turn-to-turn faults that eventually lead to short circuits to ground. [24]”
• Rotor faults. The rotor of the BLDC are PM and the major fault of rotor is
the damaged rotor magnet [24]. Some permanent magnets corrode [30] and
cracks formed during manufacturing [31] can lead to disintegration. The
partial demagnetization of the magnets may also influence the magnetic
flux density distribution [32]. Other faults may be the broken rotor bar
or cracked rotor end-rings [17]. These faults are mainly caused by excess
stresses.
• Eccentricity-related faults can be categorized as static and/or dynamic air-
gap irregularities. The dynamic eccentricity is the character describing the
displacement between the center of the rotor and the center of the rotation.
The possible reasons are bent rotor shaft, bearing wear or misalignment,
and mechanical resonance. Static eccentricity may be caused by the ovality
of the stator core or incorrect positioning of the rotor or stator. When the
eccentricity becomes large, it can result in damage of stator and rotor.
• Bearing and gearbox faults or failures. Bearing failures account for the
vast majority of the recorded motor failure [33]. The bearing failures are
caused by continued stress, inherent eccentricity, fatigue and other exter-
nal causes, such as unbalanced load, improper installation, contamination
and corrosion, and improper lubrication. This kind of fault may lead to
excessive noises and vibrations.
2.3. Fault Model of EM
As addressed in [25, 34], the fault of EM can be modeled as component faults
fc(t) or parameter faults aij(t) as shown in Fig. 3.
The component fault occurs when some condition changes in the system.
In some other cases, the faults can be expressed as a change in the system
8
Electric 
Motor
Component faults
Parameter faults
 cf t
 ija t
 Ry t
Sensors faults
 sf t
 y t
    Sensors
Actuator faults
 af t
 u t
 Ru t    Actuators
Processing
and Control
Actuation ElectricMotor
Component faults
Parameter faults
Output
 cf t
 ija t
 Ru t  Ry t
Output
Sensors faults
Measured
Output
 sf t
 Ry t  y t    Sensors
Actuator faults
Input Actuation
 af t
 u t  Ru t    Actuators
Figure 3: Fault model of electric motor
parameter. Then the mathematical fault model can be constructed as:
x˙ = Ax+Bu+DTl + fc (t) (7)
or
x˙ = Ax+Bu+DTl +
∑(∑
aijxj
)
ei
= (A+ ∆A)x+Bu+DTl, (8)
where ei is the ith basis vector, and ∆A is the discrepancy of the state-transition
matrix caused by parameter faults. Indexes i, j are related to the EM system
and can be determined by fault diagnosis. Fault models (7) and (8) are equiv-
alent in describing the component fault and the system matrix A is influenced
by the component faults.
Solving the foregoing equation (8) from the time instant k to k + 1 with a
constant control input u(k), we obtain
xR (k + 1) = e
(A+∆A)hxR (k) + e
(A+∆A)h
{∫ h
0
e−(A+∆A)tdt
}
(Bu(k) +DTl) ,
(9)
where h is the step size, xR(k+ 1) and xR(k) are real sates at the time instants
k + 1 and k, respectively and the subscript “R” represents real value rather
than the measured one. Integrating
∫ h
0
e−(A+∆A)tdt and using the first order
approximation e−(A+∆A)h ≈ I − (A+ ∆A)h, we have:∫ h
0
e−(A+∆A)tdt ≈ −(A+ ∆A)−1
[
e−(A+∆A)h − I
]
≈ h. (10)
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Moreover, substituting (10) into (9), it follows that
xR (k + 1) ≈ e∆Ah
{
eAh [xR (k) + (Bu(k) +DTl)h]
}
. (11)
To compensate the load torque and cancel the influence of the system state
xR(k), the control torque u(k) can be designed as:
u(k) =
1
h
u0(k)− 1
h
B+(xR(k) +DTlh), (12)
where B+ = BT (BBT + ςI)−1) is the pseudo-inverse of the matrix B and ς is
a small positive number.
Then, substituting (12) into (11), we obtain
xR (k + 1) ≈ e∆AheAhBu0(k). (13)
When the motor is assumed to be a 1-dimensional speed or torque control
system, we obtain:
xR (k + 1) ≈ e∆ah
{
eahb
}
u0 (k) = ηgu0 (k) (14a)
yR (k + 1) = cxR (k + 1) ≈ ηcgu0 (k) = ηu+ (k) (14b)
with g = eahb being the transfer function from input u0(k) to state xR(k + 1)
without component faults, and u+(k) = cgu0(k) being the equivalent input.
In the following section, the control input u(k) will refer to this equivalent
input u+(k). The term e∆ah is denoted as the effectiveness factor η describing
the component faults, and it is constrained in the interval η ∈ [0, 1] practically.
Different values of the η correspond to different scenarios, for example, a) η = 1,
the EM works normally and no fault occurs; b) 0 < η < 1 refers to malfunctions,
in which the EM partially loses effectiveness, but not fail totally; c) η = 0
denotes a complete failure.
It is clearly observed from (14b) that the component fault of the EM can be
represented by a multiplicative effectiveness factor η. The result in this section
establishes the mathematical foundation to describe the component fault in a
multiplicative way.
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3. VSD System Fault Modeling
3.1. Introduction of VSD and Potential Faults
To effectively and precisely drive the EM, VSD system is essential. It consists
of the EM as the plant, sensors to measure the system state and output signal,
processing and control component to generate control command, and actuators
to drive the EM.
In the VSD system, sensors are adopted to measure the motor velocity,
position and the output voltage of the inverter. Sensors can be mechanical or
electrical, and the reliability of mechanical sensor is lower than the electrical
one due to mechanical complexity [21]. For the BLDC, the sensors may be the
Hall position sensor and the electrical tachometer. The loss of a Hall sensor
results in torque pulsations when the rotor is moving.
Actuators in VSD are inverters which convert DC electricity to AC electricity
since almost all PM motors are inverter-fed. Various faults can occur in the
inverter, such as the loss of one or more switches of a phase, the short circuit of
a switch, and the opening of one of the lines to the machine [17].
3.2. Fault Model of Sensors and Actuators in VSD
Fault of sensors and actuators are often modeled as the additive fault as
shown in Fig. 4. As described in Fig, 4a, the parameter fs(t) denotes the
sensors faults. Then the output of sensor under fault is obtained as:
y(t) = yR(t) + fs(t). (15)
All the sensors’ faults can be described by choosing a proper fs(t) vector. For
example, when the output stucks at a particular value a, fs(t) can be chosen as
a− yR(t).
Similar to the sensors fault, the real actuation uR(t) and the actuator com-
mand u(t) are connected via the actuator fault vector fa(t):
uR(t) = u(t) + fa(t). (16)
11
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(a) Fault model of VSD sensors
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(b) Fault model of VSD actuators
Figure 4: Fault model of sensors and actuators
It is observed that actuator will generate an additional control command to
feed the plant after fault occurs. When the sensor is faulty, the output will have
a direct bias affecting nominal measurement. Thus, the fault in actuators and
sensors belongs to the additive category. This section establishes the foundation
of modeling the sensor and actuator fault in an additive way.
4. Fault Model of EM-VSD System
Considering all potential faults in EM, sensors and actuators, the schematic
diagram of the overall EM-VSD system is shown in Fig. 1. Based on the analysis
in the previous two sections, the EM suffers the multiplicative fault represented
by ∆A, and the sensors and actuators in VSD system may occur the additive
fault fs(t) and fa(t). Then the state space model of the EM-VSD system in the
presence of faults/failures can be constructed as:x˙ = (A+ ∆A)x+B [u+ fa (t)] +DTly = Cx+ fs (t) . (17)
In view of the output relationship (14), and substituting the potential fault
model (15) and (16) into (17), we get the output of the overall system as:
y = η
(
u+ + fa(t)
)
+ fs(t). (18)
Denoting the offset as yo = ηfa(t)+fs(t), which is on the basis of precise output
y under the nominal control signal u+, equation (18) is further written as:
y = ηu+ + yo. (19)
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Now, we have developed the fault model of an EM-VSD system as presented
in (19). Considering the fact that the EM-VSD system is working either in the
speed control mode or in the torque control mode. Then we can get the general
fault frame of an EM-VSD system in speed control mode and torque control
mode as: ω = ηωωc + ωo,T = ηTTc + To,
Speed control mode
Torque control mode
(20)
where ωc and Tc are the angular velocity control command and the torque con-
trol command corresponding to the speed control mode and the torque control
mode, respectively, ηω and ηT are the effectiveness factors representing the com-
ponent fault of the EM in speed control mode and torque control mode, ωo amd
To are the additive measurement offset as a combination of the actuator fault
and the sensor fault in VSD system, and ω and T are the measured angular
velocity and output torque.
5. General Fault Model of Momentum Exchange Devices
The most commonly used momentum exchange devices in aerospace mission
are RWs and CMGs. CMGs can be further divided into SGCMG, DGCMG and
VSCMG. The differences between these categories are the number of degree
of control freedom and the working mode of flywheels. Specifically, the RW
and SGCMG are single degree-of-freedom devices, while DGCMG and VSCMG
have two and three degree-of-freedom, respectively. From the working mode of
flywheels perspective, SGCMGs and DGCMGs hold their flywheel speed at a
constant value [8], whereas the the rotor speed of RWs and VSCMG are time-
varying.
Although RWs and CMGs have different working principles, these momen-
tum exchange devices can be modeled by a series of cascade EM-VSD systems
to drive the wheel and the gimbal frame separately. As stated in [35], the dy-
namics of CMG gimbal is independent of rotor momentum for the case of a
very stiff gimbal. In parallel, we assume that dynamics of gimbal are working
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independent. In each control loop, the potential fault and the corresponding
model are given in Section 2 and 3. When they are constructed as a cascade
instrument, there will be a high dependence among each system and the overall
fault model will be in a multiplicative form. Consequently, the general fault
model of a momentum exchange device is given by:
y =
m∑
j=1
{
nj
Π
ij=1
[
ηijuc
ij + yo
ij
]}
, (21)
where the superscript ij means the ith element in series of the jth parallel term,
m and nj represents the total number of parallel terms and the total number
of term in series of the jth parallel term, u
ij
c is the nominal control command,
y
ij
o is the offset caused by fault, failure and malfunctions, and ηij ∈ [0, 1] is the
control effectiveness factor. In the following, by using the general fault model
of the momentum exchange devices proposed in (21), we give the specific fault
model of the RW, SGCMG, DGCMG and VSCMG, respectively.
5.1. RW Fault Model
RW contains a rotating flywheel and internal BLDC motor as well as asso-
ciated electronics [8]. This device can be regarded as a single loop EM-VSD
system. It is always fed by control commands in order to generate desired
control torque via acceleration or deceleration. Therefore, the whole loop is
considered as the acceleration control loop. When the RW works in the torque
control mode, the fault model can be given by:
τrw = ηrwτc + τo. (22)
where τc is the command torque, ηrw is the effectiveness of the RW, τo is the
output offset due to the fault and τrw is the real output. This equation is
consistent with the fault model of RW-actuated spacecraft system in existing
literature, such as [12], [36] and [37].
5.2. SGCMG Fault Model
SGCMG contains a spinning rotor mounted on a gimbal. In nominal condi-
tion, the rotor holds a constant speed using a BLDC motor while the gimbal is
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manipulated to change the direction of angular momentum by a stepper motor.
Then a gyroscopic reaction torque orthogonal to both the rotor spin and gim-
bal axes is generated. With a small input of the gimbal, a much larger control
torque is produced to act on the spacecraft, which is the so-called torque am-
plification characteristic. More specifically, the torque is proportional to both
the angular momentum and gimbal angular rate calculated as:
τ = −h0δ˙tˆ, (23)
where h0 is the constant angular momentum of the spinning rotor determined
by the moment inertia of the wheel Jsc and motor speed ωsc as h0 = Jscωsc,
δ is the gimbal angle, and tˆ is a unit vector in the direction of output torque.
The minus symbol “ - ” in (23) means the output torque lies in the opposite
direction of tˆ.
The SGCMG is considered as a combination of two EM-VSD systems. The
potential fault of SGCMG may exist in the rotor control loop and the gimbal
frame control loop. We denote the rotor’s EM-VSD control loop as the first
degree-of-freedom and this loop is marked with a superscript “r”, and the control
loop of gimbal frame as the second degree-of-freedom with a superscript “g”.
According to the independent assumption, the dynamics of rotor and gimbal
will not influence each other in their own loop control. Then for the rotor,
the angular momentum is the product of moment of inertia and the spindle
speed, i.e. h0 = Jscωsc, and the motor speed is controlled by the VSD system.
Considering the possible fault in the rotor control loop, the angular momentum
can be computed as:
h0 = η
rJscωc + ho, (24)
where ho is the output offset. When the flywheel works normally, the output
h0 equals to the command angular momentum hc = Jscωc. Considering the
control loop of gimbal, its fault model is expressed as:
δ˙ = ηg δ˙c + δ˙o (25)
with δ˙c and δ˙o being the commanded gimbal rate and the gimbal rate offset
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caused by fault. Substituting equations (24) and (25) into (23), we obtain the
fault model of a SGCMG as
τ = − [ηrJscωc + ho]
[
ηg δ˙c + δ˙o
]
tˆ. (26)
Noting that the saturation is not treated as fault since it is a kind of con-
straints. Based on (26), it is clear that different combinations of ηr, ηg, ho and
δ˙o represent the different fault scenarios in a SGCMG. To illustrate all potential
faults and fault-free situation of a SGCMG, the potential fault cases in each
single control loop (either rotor control loop or gimbal frame control loop) are
defined as:
N : Nominal working condition;
Fa : Partially lose effect, without offset;
Fb : Totally fail, without offset;
Fc : Partially lose effect and have offset;
Fd : Totally fail and have offset;
Fe : Pure offset without losing effect.
Combining these different work conditions, the fault model list of SGCMG is
obtained as shown in Table 1. This model is consistent with that in [14], where
only the gimbal fault is considered. To the best knowledge of authors, this is
the first attempt to establish a systematic fault model of SGCMG.
5.3. DGCMG Fault Model
Double gimbal control moment gyro is a flywheel with a constant angular
speed mounted on an orthogonal installed gimbal frame. Different from the
SGCMG, a DGCMG has two gimbals including the inner gimbal gˆi and outer
gimbal gˆo. All these gimbals together with the direction of angular momentum
hˆ form the CMG frame, denoted as G =
{
hˆ, gˆi, gˆo
}
. Therefore, the DGCMG
can be modeled by three EM-VSD systems working independently. Similar to
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Table 1: Work condition and fault model of SGCMG
Rotor Gimbal Model
N,Fd
N −h∗δ˙ctˆ
Fa −h∗
[
ηg δ˙c
]
tˆ
Fb 0
Fc −h∗
[
ηg δ˙c + δ˙o
]
tˆ
Fd −h∗δ˙otˆ
Fe −h∗
[
δ˙c + δ˙o
]
tˆ
Fa
N − [ηrJscωc] δ˙ctˆ
Fa − [ηrJscωc]
[
ηg δ˙c
]
tˆ
Fb 0
Fc − [ηrJscωc]
[
ηg δ˙c + δ˙o
]
tˆ
Fd − [ηrJscωc] δ˙otˆ
Fe − [ηrJscωc]
[
δ˙c + δ˙o
]
tˆ
Fb
N ,Fa,Fb
0Fc,Fd,Fd
Fc
N − [ηrJscωc + ho] δ˙ctˆ
Fa − [Jscsatωm (ηrωc) + ho]
[
ηg δ˙c
]
tˆ
Fb 0
Fc − [ηrJscωc + ho]
[
ηg δ˙c + δ˙o
]
tˆ
Fd − [ηrJscωc + ho] δ˙otˆ
Fe − [ηrJscωc + ho]
[
δ˙c + δ˙o
]
tˆ
Fe
N − [Jscωc + ho] δ˙ctˆ
Fa − [Jscωc + ho]
[
ηg δ˙c
]
tˆ
Fb 0
Fc − [Jscωc + ho]
[
ηg δ˙c + δ˙o
]
tˆ
Fd − [Jscωc + ho] δ˙otˆ
Fe − [Jscωc + ho]
[
δ˙c + δ˙o
]
tˆ
Note: ηr, ηg ∈ (0, 1) in this table, h∗ = hc, command angu-
lar momentum for working condition N, and h∗ = ho, pure
angular momentum offset for working condition Fd.
the mechanism of SGCMG, the output torque is generated by rotating gimbals
[35]. Based on the independence assumption, the torques generated by inner
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gimbal and outer gimbal are independent. Then the nominal overall control
torque of a DGCMG can be expressed as [38]:
τ = τi + τo = −h0δ˙itˆi − h0δ˙otˆo, (27)
where τi and τo are the torques generated by the inner gimbal loop and outer
gimbal loop, δ˙i is the gimbal rate of the inner gimbal, δ˙o is the gimbal rate of
the outer gimbal, and tˆi and tˆo are the directions of the inner and outer output
torque. Then for the inner gimbal and outer gimbal, the fault models are:
τi = − [ηrJdcωc + ho]
[
ηgi δ˙ci + δ˙oi
]
tˆi (28)
and
τo = − [ηrJdcωc + ho]
[
ηgo δ˙co + δ˙oo
]
tˆo, (29)
respectively. The subscript “dc” represents DGCMG, “i” represents inner gim-
bal and “o” represents outer gimbal.
5.4. VSCMG Fault Model
VSCMG can be considered as a combination of RW and CMGs. It has
two major categories: single gimbal VSCMG (SGVSCMG) and double gimbal
VSCMG (DGVSCMG). The fault model of these two types of VSCMG are
addressed in the following.
a). SGVSCMG
This SGVSCMG is a combination of a RW and a SGCMG, so it has two
working modes, i.e., RW working mode and SGCMG working mode. The output
torque is generated by the acceleration in the direction of angular momentum
working as the RW and the gimbal rotation working as the SGCMG [39, 40].
The nominal output torque of a SGVSCMG can be expressed as:
τ = τr + τc = −Jsvsω˙svstˆr − h (ωsvs) δ˙tˆg, (30)
where τr and τc are output torque generated in the RW working mode and
the SGCMG working mode, and the subscript “svs” represents SGVSCMG.
18
Considering the potential fault in RW, the fault model of the RW working
mode is:
τr = − [ηrsvsJsvsω˙csvs + τosvs ] tˆr. (31)
When the SGVSCMG is in the SGCMG working mode, only the measurement
of angular momentum, or the angular velocity equivalently, is used to design the
gimbal rate command. Thus we just need to consider the additive fault caused
by the sensors in the rotor control loop when SGVSCMG is in SGCMG working
mode. Then the fault model of the SGCMG working mode can be established
as:
τc = − [Jsvsωcsvs + hosvs ]
[
ηg δ˙c + δ˙o
]
tˆg. (32)
b). DGSGCMG
The DGSGCMG can be regarded as a combination of the RW and the
DGCMG. The output torque contains three parts: 1) τr caused by rotor ac-
celeration; 2) τgi generated by by inner gimbal rotation; and 3) τgo caused by
outer gimbal rotation. The output torque can be expressed as[38, 41]:
τ = τr + τgi + τgo = −Jdvsω˙dvstˆr − h (ωdvs) δ˙gi tˆgi − h (ωdvs) δ˙go tˆgo , (33)
where the subscript “dvs” represents DGVSCMG. The fault model of RW work-
ing mode is same as equation (31). The fault relating to theDGCMG is described
as
τgi = − [Jdvsωcdvs + hodvs ]
[
ηgi δ˙ic + δ˙io
]
tˆgi (34)
and
τgo = − [Jdvsωcdvs + hodvs ]
[
ηgo δ˙oc + δ˙oo
]
tˆgo . (35)
6. Simulation Demonstration
This Section demonstrates attitude control results of RWs or SGCMGs ac-
tuated spacecraft under different fault scenarios. The severities of the faults are
qualitatively analyzed to give a guideline for the fault-tolerant control system
design.
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6.1. Fault Effects in EM-VSD
According to the failure analysis reported in [42], 32% of the failures comes
from the Attitude and Orbit Control System (AOCS), which is a combination of
the Attitude Determination and Control System (ADCS) and Guidance, Nav-
igation and Control (GNC) subsystem. Among the failures of AOCS, 44% of
them are related to actuators including Thrusters, RWs, CMG and XIPS. For
the failure type, more than half of the failures (54%) are mechanical, and a
relative small portion (20%) are electrical. The detailed analysis are shown in
Fig. 5.
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54%
Electrical
20%
 
Failure type
Unknown
17%
Software error
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Electronic circuitry
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Gyro-scope
17%
CMG
4%Reaction wheel
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Momentum wheel
10%
XIPS
10%
Thruster
14% Oxidiser tank
2%
Fuel tank
8%
Enviroment
6%
 
 Failure impact and component failure for AOCS
Figure 5: AOCS failure distributions [42]
To demonstrate the EM-VSD performance under different fault conditions,
all the listed potential faults Fa to Fe in Section 5.2 are compared with the nom-
inal condition. Taking the practical variation of possible fault and failure into
consideration, an exponential function uout = η + (1 − η)e−ta(t−tc) is adopted
to describe the dynamic characteristic of the multiplicative fault and this expo-
nential function is also used in the SGCMG-actuated spacecraft simulations. In
this equation, η represents the effectiveness factor of the motor after the occur-
rence of fault or failure, ta represents the time constant for the fault or failure,
and tc is the time instant that fault or failure happens. In the simulation, the
time constant ta is chosen to be 2 and 1 for fault and failure, respectively. In
the nominal condition N , the output torque is set as 0.4 Nm. The actuator is
20
assumed to lose its effectiveness at t = 5s and the bias offset is added at t = 15s.
As shown in Fig.6, the effectiveness factor η is chosen as 0.75 and the offset is
chosen as 0.04, which is 10% of the nominal command. These parameters are
also used in the RW-actuated spacecraft simulation. For the working condition
Fe, it is similar to part of the Fig. 6c and Fig. 6d when the offset is added and
the demonstration is omitted here.
6.2. Attitude Control Results of RW-Atuated Spacecraft
Before we move forward to the demonstrate the control results of RW-
actuated and CMG-actuated spacecraft under actuator faults, the dynamics
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Figure 6: Fault scenarios of RWs
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and kinematics of the system can be found in [43] as:q˙ = 12
[ −qTv
qoI3 + q
×
v
]
ω
Jω˙ + ω× (Jω +H) = τc + d
(36)
where q = [q0, q
T
v ]
T is the unit quaternion, ω is the angular velocity of the
spacecraft, J = JT is moment of inertia matrix, H is the angular momentum
of the actuators and d is the external disturbance. τc = −H˙ is the output of
the actuators.
To have a better demonstration the influence of the RW fault/failure to the
attitude control system, we do not consider RW redundancy in the simulation.
Then the installation matrix of the RWs is identity. Considering the fault model
of the RW given by (22), the output of the RW cluster can be given by:
τ = Eηu+Eo (37)
where u is the control command calculated by the controller, Eη = diag[η1, η2, η3]
is the effectiveness matrix and Eo = diag[uo1, uo2, uo3] is the offset caused by
the RW faults.
The objective of the attitude control of this simulation is to stabilize the
attitude and angular velocity such that the spacecraft can change its orientation
from the initial value to the target. The initial Euler angle is set to be 60 deg,
−20 deg and 30 degree and the initial angular velocity is zero. The attitude
controller in the simulation is the widely used cascade PD control in [3], which
is in the form of:
u = −J
{
2k sat
Li
(qe) + cω
}
, (38)
with
Li = (c/2k) min
{√
4ai |qei|, |ωi|max
}
, (39)
where J represents the moment of inertia of the satellite, qe is the quaternion-
error vector, ω is the spacecraft angular velocity, c and k are natural frequency
and damping ratio related parameters. The parameters ai = umax/Jii and
|ωi|max are the maximum acceleration and angular velocity along the ith axis,
|ωi|max is set to be 4 deg/s, and the PD gains are k = 9.54 and c = 5.5.
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The simulation results of the RW-actuated spacecraft under different fault
scenarios including the fault-free situation are shown in Fig. 7 to 11. In Fig.
7, the trajectories of Euler angle, angular velocity, control torque and angular
momentum of RWs in the nominal condition are presented. It can be seen
from Fig. 7a to 7d that the required maneuver is completed in 40 s. The
scenario that the wheel along Z axis partially loses its effectiveness at 5 s (the
fault Fa) is demonstrated in Fig. 8. Compared to Fig. 7, the whole system is
controllable, but the stabilization is achieved in a longer period. It should be
mentioned from Fig. 8c that the maximum output torque drops to η times of
the command gradually after 5 s. Fig. 9 shows the control result when the third
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Figure 7: RW-actuated attitude control result under nominal condition
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Figure 8: RW-actuated attitude control result under Fa
wheel totally fails at 5 s (the failure Fb). It is clear that the axis about which
the failed RW is installed becomes uncontrollable and the Euler angle diverges
as shown in Fig. 9a. Fig. 9b states the angular velocity in Z axis keeps at a
constant after the wheel fails. This is because the speed of the third RW does
not change after failure happens as shown in Fig. 9d. Fig. 10 shows the control
result in the condition that the third wheel partially loses its effectiveness at 5
s and experiences the additive fault in 50 s (the fault Fc). Comparing with Fig.
8, the transient process is almost the same, but a larger steady-state error is
observed in Fig. 10a. The abrupt bias after 50 s is clearly observed in Fig. 10c.
As shown in Fig. 11c, the wheel suffers from failure at 5s and offset at 50 s (the
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Figure 9: RW-actuated attitude control result under Fb
failure Fd). With the influence of bias, the angular velocity of the spacecraft
and the wheel speed diverges as depicted in Fig. 11b and Fig. 11d. Same as
Fig. 9, the whole system is uncontrollable under the RW failure.
From the simulation results in Fig. 7 to 11, we can obtain the following
qualitative conclusions:
• The RW failure has more serious consequences than the RW fault in atti-
tude control, and will directly make the system uncontrollable and unsta-
ble when there is no RW redundancy.
• The additive fault is more serious than the multiplicative fault, and it can
result in steady-state error;
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Figure 10: RW-actuated attitude control result under Fc
• The partial loss of effectiveness fault can be regarded that the wheel is
replaced by another one with a smaller control capacity. So, it does not
affect the system’s controllability.
6.3. Attitude Control Results of SGCMG-Actuated Spacecraft
Simulation of SGCMG-actuated spacecraft system is conducted in this Sec-
tion. A pyramid configuration of four SGCMGs as shown in Fig. 12 is adopted
to control the spacecraft. The attitude controller, the initial states and target
are the same as they are in Section 6.2. The generalized singular robust inverse
method is used to steer the gimbal as in [3]. Thus the gimbal rate command
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Figure 11: RW-actuated attitude control result under Fd
can be calculated as follows:
δ˙c =
1
h0
A#u and A# = AT
[
AAT + λE
]−1
(40)
whereA is the Jacobian matrix, λ = 0.01 exp
[−10 det (AAT )], and the matrix
E is expressed as:
E =
[
1 ε3 ε2
ε3 1 ε1
ε2 ε1 1
]
> 0
with εi = 0.01 sin (0.5pit+ φi), φ1 = 0, φ2 = pi/2 and φ3 = pi.
Since we only consider the gimbal fault, then the actual gimbal rate can be
given using the fault model described by (26) as:
δ˙ = Eηg δ˙c +Ega (41)
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Figure 12: Pyramid configuration of the SGCMGs
where Eηg = diag[η
g
1 , η
g
2 , η
g
3 , η
g
4 ] is the effectiveness matrix of the gimbal loop
and Ega = diag[δ˙o1 , δ˙o2 , δ˙o3 , δ˙o4 ] is the additive bias of the gimbal loop caused
by faults.
The nominal angular momentum of the rotor is set as 10 Nm and the max-
imum gimbal angular velocity is set as 100 deg/s. The initial gimbal angle is
[0, 0, 0, 0]T deg. Considering the one degree of redundancy in the pyramid con-
figuration, the SGCMG pair in the x − z plane, i.e. 1st and 3rd SGCMGs are
assumed to be faulty simultaneously. To avoid fuzzy, duplication and repetition,
we only implement some typical scenarios in Table 1 in the simulation, which
include 1-3 rotors failure with offset in Fig. 14, 1-3 gimbal failure with offset in
Fig. 15 and both the rotor and gimbals are failure in Fig. 17. In the following
simulations, the effectiveness factors and bias of the rotor control loop are set
as 0.5 and 2 Nms, while 0.75 and 20 deg/s for the gimbal control loop.
Fig. 13 shows the attitude control results under nominal condition. It can be
seen from Fig. 13 that the maneuver is completed in about 10 s. The maximum
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Figure 13: SGCMG-actuated attitude control result under nominal condition
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Figure 14: SGCMG-actuated attitude control result in the presence of only rotor fault
output torque is the product of rotor’s maximum angular momentum and gim-
bal’s maximum angular speed. During the whole process, there is no singularity.
Fig. 14 presents the Euler angle trajectory, rotor’s angular momentum, gimbal
angle and output torque in the presence of rotor failures. Fig. 14b shows that
the rotor fails at 2 s and the angular momentum drops to zero rapidly. Conse-
quently, the output torque also becomes zero along with the variation of rotor’s
angular momentum, which is shown in Fig. 14d. When this pair of CMGs
totally fails, the system will turn to be uncontrollable. When the bias is added
at 8 s, there is a jump in the output torque. After the bias, the system goes
to be stable state in about 20 s in Fig. 14a. Fig. 15 shows the control result
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(d) Output control torque
Figure 15: SGCMG-actuated attitude control result in the presence of only gimbal fault
when the EM-VSD system of gimbal fails into failure. When the gimbal fails
into failure, the system becomes unstable until the additive fault occurs. After
the additive fault, the system approaches to stable state as shown in Fig. 15a.
Fig. 17 shows the simulation results when both the variable speed drive system
of rotor and gimbal experience fault. We can see an obvious steady-state error
in Fig. 17a and output jump due to the fault.
Parallel to the simulation results of RW-actuated system, we can obtain the
similar qualitative conclusions:
• The gimbal fault is more serious than the rotor fault when the rotor’s
angular momentum is greater than zero;
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Figure 16: SGCMG-actuated attitude control result in the presence of rotor fault and gimbal
fault
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• The angular momentum of rotor is the amplification factor of the SGCMG.
The fault in rotor can be regarded as the replacement of another SGCMG
with a smaller control capacity.
• The additive fault may result in steady-state error.
7. Fault-tolerant control strategies
Various fault-tolerant controllers (FTCs) have been developed, as summa-
rized in the review of [9] and [44]. Generally speaking, the existing FTCs can be
divided into the passive FTCs, active FTCs and the hybrid of passive and active
FTCs. A comparative study between the active and passive approaches is given
in [10]. For these FTCs, the redundancy of the system, including but not lim-
ited to the hardware redundancy, is the key factor and the significant difference
lies in how these redundancies are used. For the passive FTCs, a single fixed
controller is designed among all admissible solution sets within the overlapped
region considering both the nominal conditions and design basis faults. This
kind of method emphasises on robustness for all identified cases rather than
achieving optimal performance. Thus the passive FTCs are more conservative
comparing with active FTCs. The active FTCs contain the fault detection and
diagnosis (FDD) scheme, reconfigurable controller, and the decision making or
redundancy management scheme. The performance of active FTCs depends
highly on the FDD results. More results can be found in [45] and [46].
In this paper, we focus on how to incorporate the proposed fault model in
fault-tolerant strategies design to accommodate SGCMG gimbal fault. Different
from the previous section where the control torque generated by the SGCMGs
expressed as τc = −h0Aδ˙, the internal torque τ = −h0Aδ˙−ω×H is adopted as
the output of the SGCMG cluster, which makes the SGCMG to be a replaceable
unit. Then the dynamic of spacecraft can be expressed as Jω˙ + ω×Jω =
τ + d, which is independent with the actuators. The schematic diagram of
two potential fault-tolerant strategies to accommodate SGCMG gimbal fault
are demonstrated in Fig. 17.
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Figure 17: Potential fault-tolerant control strategies to handle gimbal fault
In Fig. 17a, an additive equivalent strategy is adopted and the real gimbal
rate δ˙ is expressed by the gimbal rate command δ˙c and a lumped bias f , i.e.
δ˙ = δ˙c+f . To estimate the lumped bias, local estimators (LE) can be designed
to estimate each component of f with respect to each SGCMG. Then the gimbal
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rate command after compensation becomes δ˙c = δ˙
′
c − fˆ . As a consequence, the
actual gimbal rate is δ˙ = δ˙
′
c − fˆ + f ≈ δ
′
c. Thus the fault-tolerant target is
achieved. Since the FDD scheme and the reconfiguration are not used, above
additive equivalent fault-tolerant strategy can be regarded as a passive strategy.
In Fig. 17b, the fault effect is described in a multiplicative way, i.e. δ˙ =
Eηg δ˙c. To complete the fault-tolerant steering law design, some strategies are
required to identify the fault and evaluate how serious the fault is, namely to
estimate the effectiveness matrix Eηg . Using the estimated effectiveness matrix
Eˆηg , some new effectiveness matrix weighted steering law can be developed
to minimize the use of the faulty SGCMG. Once the estimation is completed,
the steering law is re-configured from the traditional one to the effectiveness
weighted one. Then the control command is reallocated and the faulty SGCMGs
can potentially be isolated. This strategy can be regarded as an active strategy.
Together with the method shown in Fig. 17a, the gimbal fault of the SGCMGs
can be handled. How to design the local estimator and estimate the equivalent
effectiveness matrix will be our future works.
8. Conclusion
This paper investigated the modeling of fault/failure in momentum exchange
devices. A general fault model is established by regarding the momentum ex-
change devices as the cascade-connected EM-VSD systems. The potential faults
of the EM-VSD system are identified, and the reason why these faults can be
categorised into multiplicative fault and additive fault is given. Based on the de-
veloped EM-VSD fault model, we further get the fault models of RW, SGCMG,
SGCMG, and VSCMG. Through simulations of spacecraft attitude control us-
ing RWs and SGCMGs as actuators, the potential faults in RW and SGCMG
as well as their influences on the control performance are analyzed in detail.
Through simulation studies, we also obtain the qualitative conclusion that the
additive fault has more serious influence than the multiplicative fault from the
viewpoint of control accuracy. This observation can be a guideline in develop-
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ing fault-tolerant control system for the momentum exchange devices actuated
spacecraft. By the end, how to incorporate the proposed fault model in fault-
tolerant strategies design to accommodate the gimbal fault of the SGCMGs are
demonstrated.
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